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THE QUINTESSENTIAL POLITICAL PROBLEM:
CURRENT CONDITIONS JUSTIFYING CURRENT
BURDENS AND THE MODERN SHIFT IN
ELECTION LAW SCRUTINY
"For the cries of pain and the hymns and protests of
oppressedpeople have summoned into convocation all the
majesty of this great Government the Government of the
greatestNation on earth. Our mission is at once the oldest
and the most basic of this country: to right wrong, to do
justice, to serve man.

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1886, the Supreme Court of the United States, presiding in an
America that had not yet adopted the responsibility and inherent truth of
the Fifteenth Amendment, recognized that voting should be "regarded as a
fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights."2
Nearly a century later, Congress passed one of the signature achievements
of the Civil Rights movement: the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965.' The
VRA has had a transformative impact on the way Americans participate in
our constitutional system, and is arguably the most significant and

I

President Lyndon B. Johnson- Address to Congress on Voting Rights (Mar. 15, 1965).

2 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (recognizing voting as fundamental

right). The Yick Wo Court quoted a decision by Lemuel Shaw, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, using language that would be reinvigorated by the Supreme
Court in the lead up to the Shelby County decision:
[T]hat in all cases where the constitution has conferred a political right or privilege,
and where the constitution has not particularly designated the manner in which that
right is to be exercised, it is clearly within the just and constitutional limits of the
legislative power to adopt any reasonable and uniform regulations, in regard to the time
and mode of exercising that right, which are designed to secure and facilitate the
exercise of such right, in a prompt, orderly, and convenient manner ....
See id at 370-71 (quoting Capen v. Foster, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 485, 489 (1832)); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. XV (stating right to vote shall not be denied).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012); see Michael Ellement, Note, The New Voter Suppression: Why
the Voting Rights Act Still Matters, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY' S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 261, 271-72
(2013) (arguing against Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas arguments repudiating presentday voter suppression).
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successful pieces of legislation in the last century.4 The VRA prohibits any
and all race based "voting qualification[s] or prerequisite[s]." 5 The
enforcement provision of the VRA was written into Section 4, and it
subjected jurisdictions with notorious and documented reputations of voter
suppression to a preclearance requirement.6 Since its inception, the VRA
has been challenged in court due to its unprecedented federalism
construction. 7 Rarely, if ever, had Congress stepped onto the state's
regulatory turf than with the VRA's preclearance requirement.8 In the last
ten years, the Tenth Amendment has regained primacy in Chief Justice
John Roberts's Supreme Court, which has shown a willingness to return
considerable latitude to the states in regulating and administering
elections. 9 The Court's decision in Shelby County v.Holder affirmed a

4 See Ellement, supra note 3, at 261-62 (noting the impact on African American participation
in covered preclearance jurisdictions); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New
Voting Rights Acts, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 176 (2007) (describing VRA as standard by which
successful legislation is judged).
5 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012) (establishing violation).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (describing no voter shall be denied right to vote based on
race); § 10301(a)-(b) (naming states using tests or devices, registration, and turnout below 50%

subject to preclearance); see also Ellen Katz, Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreat

from Election Law, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1615, 1634 (2009) (describing preclearance as most
consistently controversial VRA provision).
7 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201, 216 (2009)
(challenging constitutionality of § 5 for Tenth Amendment encroachment and political
subdivision analysis); see also Persily, supra note 4, 215-26 (discussing novel federalism
implications raised by VRA and Congressional reauthorization); Katz, supra note 6, at 1634-35
(discussing federalism concerns raised during Rehnquist Era).
8 See sources cited, supra note 7.
9 See Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 421-22 (2008) (limiting federal VRA regulation in
state executive office vacancy appointments); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S.
181, 200-01 (2008) (continuing rigid, legal, practical analysis in voter identification decision);
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451-52 (2008) (calling for
fact-based evidence gathering in facial challenge); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres,
552 U.S. 196, 207 (2008) (focusing exclusively on legal analysis rather than practical effect on
participation); see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (ruling
against state regulation of party primary process and allowing party to have open primary);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56-57 (1986) (establishing standards by which court should
review discrimination against minority classes); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
(1983) (establishing balancing test to determine valid restrictions on voter and party access);
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (striking Illinois statute keeping voters from changing
parties until twenty-three months after election); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
670 (1966) (striking down poll taxes as unconstitutional burden on rights of voters); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (striking Texas statute preventing active military members from
registering to vote while serving); Katz, supra note 6, at 1615, 1619, 1623, 1626-27, 1631-32
(strengthening federalism principles in election law jurisprudence where centralized authority was
recognized in 1960s-70s). But see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (deciding case based
on extreme irregularity of district shape in § 5 VRA challenge). In Shaw, the challenged
congressional district map in North Carolina was drawn with such a "bizarre" district that it was
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new standard of review-originally unveiled in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility DistrictNo. 1 v. Holder-which began in the second term

of the Roberts Court: "current burdens.

.

.justified by current needs." 0

This Note analyzes the impact of the Shelby County decision on how
litigators will need to prove facially neutral challenges to election law
changes in jurisdictions that no longer have a preclearance requirement."
We will focus on Texas, and how the Lone Star State used a federal court
decision in Indiana on voter identification statutes to craft legislation that
has wrought considerable controversy. 12 Crawford v. Marion County

inexplicable for reasons other than race and therefore required strict scrutiny. See id. at 644
(quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
See generally Janai S. Nelson, The CausalContext of DisparateVote Denial,54 B.C. L. REv. 579
(2013) (discussing purpose of Gingles in VRA cases); Richard R. Hesp, Comment, Electoral
Data in Racial-Bloc Analysis: A Solution for Staleness and Special Circumstances Problems,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409 (1995) (reviewing effectiveness of Gingles Test prior to LULAC
decision).
10 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
11 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966), abrogated by Shelby
Cnty. Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (noting difficult of singular lawsuits in combatting
voter suppression). Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that "Congress had found that case-by-case
litigation was inadequate to combat wide-spread and persistent discrimination in voting, because
of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics
invariably encountered in these lawsuits." See id.at 328; Katz, supra note 6, at 1623 (noting
difficulties in challenging state statutes without preclearance); Hearing,infra note 27 (statement
of Prof. Spencer Overton) (arguing Shelby County will delay remedies that preclearance allowed
expeditiously); see also Doug Chapin, Voting Rights After Shelby County: Bring on the Election
Geeks, 12 ELECTION L.J. 327 (2013) (arguing winners in post-Shelby jurisprudence are dataoriented researchers). Chapin argues:
Notwithstanding considerable pessimism, Congress (or at least some members) are
taking up the Court's call to update the coverage formula of the Act and will need data
for that effort; [w]ithout Section 5,plaintiffs in cases of all kinds are going to need data
to make the case that certain election procedures violate Section 2 of the Act; [b]y the
same token, defendants are going to need data to demonstrate that their laws or
practices do not violate the Act or make the case in advance of a lawsuit that
litigation is unnecessary; [e]veryone concerned is going to have to use data to evaluate
whether litigation is even advisable given the higher costs associated with the need to
actually go to court; and [a]dvocates and election officials are going to need data to
reach out to legislators to identify opportunities to amend or repeal laws that might
violate the Act thus avoiding litigation.
Id.; see About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Judicial Review of Voting Changes,
Administrative Review
of
Voting Changes, U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
http://www.jusfice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec 5/about.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (noting on
average DOJ reviews 5,000 §5 claims and up to 20,000 voting changes annually).
12 See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 127 (2012) (naming Indiana statute as source of
guidance for Texas's argument before preclearance court), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013); see
also Samuel P. Langholz, Fashioning a Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93
IOWA L. REv. 731, 788 (February 2008) (examining parameters within which voter identification
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Election Board3 reviewed an Indiana voter identification statute, holding
that the state's prerogative to regulate elections outweighed the imposition
on voter's rights.' 4 Texas is no longer covered under Section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act after the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Shelby
County.15 Some political observers and scholars believe that Texas could
turn from a Republican stronghold to a swing state based on current
population growth and demographic shifts. 16 Given the overtly political
implications of Shelby County, it is incumbent upon the federal government
to maintain strong oversight over elections-while still balancing Tenth
Amendment federalism interests-when state statutes impact minority
voters.' 7 This standard does not adequately ensure an open process for the

statutes could pass constitutional muster prior to Crawford); Texas v. Holderand the Proprietyof
Voter ID Legislation, HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.harvardjlpp.com/2012/09/texas-v-holder-and-the-propriety-of-voter-id-legislation/ (noting nexus between
Texas v. Holder, SB 14 and Crawfordv. Marion County).
13 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
14 See id. at 204.
15 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see History of Federal Voting Rights
Laws:
The
Voting Rights
Act
of 1965,
U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro b.php (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) (providing
history and context to Congress passing the VRA); JurisdictionsPreviously CoveredBy Section
5, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013). See generally, Joaquin Castro, Mr. Castro Goes to Washington: A Behindthe-Scenes Account of the Big Votes, DashedHopes, Tough Choices, andReal Accomplishments
of a Freshman Lawmaker's First Year in Congress, TEX. MONTHLY (Jan. 17, 2014 7:30 AM),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/behind-the-scenes-of-joaquin-castros-first-year-incongress?fullpage-1 (discussing political landscape for Latino candidates in Texas).
16 See Michael James Burns, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act: Getting the
Right Answer with the Wrong Standard, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 247 (2012) (summarizing
burdens of proof for VRA claims of discriminatory purpose and effect); Michael J. Pitts,
Redistrictingand DiscriminatoryPurpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1590-91 (2010) (discussing
importance of politically accountable representation and competitive districting); see also, e.g.,
Elahe Izadi, How Democrats Are Aiming to Make Texas a Swing State, NAT'L J. (Sept. 8, 2013),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/how-democrats-are-aiming-to-make-texas-a-swing-state20130908 (reporting on Democratic electoral organization efforts in traditionally Republican
Texas); Mara Liasson, It's All Politics: Will Texas Become a PresidentialBattleground?, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (July 1, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/07/01/197692543/willtexas-become-a-presidential-battleground (studying political impact and effects of population
demographic changes in Texas); Richard Parker, Lone Star Blues, N.Y. TIMES OPINION PAGES
(Feb.
19,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/opinion/getting-texas-to-godemocratic.html_(writing on increased minority population in Texas threatening traditionally
Republican safe state). But see Nate Cohn, These Eight Charts Explain Why Blue Texas Won't
Happen, NEW REPUB. (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114145/blue-texaseight-charts-show-why-it-wont-happen (rejecting imminence of Blue Texas because Texas
Latinos are disproportionately ineligible to vote). See generally, Richard Pildes, How Much do
Safe Seats in Congress Contribute to Polarizationand Gridlock, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Oct. 2,
11:02 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p-55648 (noting lack of blowback on Republican U.S.
Representatives because GOP controlled redistricting after 2010 midterms).
17 See Katz, supra note 6, at 1617 (reviewing Roberts roll-back of federal involvement in
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fundamental right that is "preservative of all rights."'18
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PRESERVATIVE RIGHT
A. The State of Affairs Leading to the Act's Passage
Before the Voting Rights Act passed, the Tenth Amendment
empowered individual sovereign states to administer and regulate all matter

pertaining to elections, voter access, and ballot access. 19 The Fifteenth
Amendment would have to wait eighty-five years for its crucial phrase to
gain any practical muscle20 While that Amendment barred states from
preventing individuals from casting their ballots on account of race, the
seminal provision of the Amendment authorized Congress to take
legislative action to enforce Section 1.21 Prior to the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, states flagrantly ignored the clarion call to equality contained in the
Fifteenth Amendment because the federal government refused to take any
decisive action in enforcing its provision. 2
In the cradle of the
Confederacy, poll taxes and literacy tests were nurtured as the federal
government stood idly by and the nation's sacrifice during the Civil War
was mocked.2 3 The federal government's appetite for spending political
capital on voting rights equality was minimal, with sparse attention paid
and apathy reigning supreme 2 4 Whatever legitimate, albeit vastly limited,
success the lawmakers in the early twentieth century had in securing a
state elections administration).
18 See YickWov. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886).
19 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving enumerated powers not delegated to federal
government to states); see also Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
20 See Ellement, supra note 3, at 265 (detailing Fifteenth Amendment's slow start in enabling
blacks right to vote).
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
22 See Ellement, supra note 3, at 265-66 (reviewing introduction of Jim Crow Era statutes
and "black codes"); see also Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2012) (writing
about need for Civil Rights Amendment to combat voter suppression), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886
(2013).
23 See Ellement, supra note 3, at 265-66 (tracing history of voter suppression and dilution
leading to Civil Rights Era legislation); see also Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (discussing
historical background leading to development of strong federal role in election regulation).
24 See Ellement, supra note 3, at 265-66 (suppressing black vote was major impetus for
passage of VRA); see also Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (noting why America needed federal
role to combat state-sponsored voter suppression); Michael J. Klarman, The Supreme Court and
Black Disenfranchisement, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECURING THE BALLOT 37, 40-41
(2006) (describing difference between Guilded Era action and Reconstruction Era legislation
regarding voting rights); Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From AntiDiscrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 How. L.J. 741, 755-56 (2006) (discussing future

alternative approaches to combatting voter suppression).
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more fair electoral system was rejected by the Supreme Court as
overstepping the limited powers of the Congress in the face of the plenary
25
powers of the state.
In the middle of the 20th century, Civil Rights activists would
begin to move the needle and achieve concrete results pushing the
Congress to assert its Constitutional authority to enact laws that would end
black disenfranchisement.26 The Civil Rights Act of 1957 allowed the U.S.
Attorney General to take singular action against anyone who prevented
people from voting based on race.27 Two other Civil Rights Acts were
passed in the early 1960s, but none related directly to the rights of blacks
and minorities to equal and unfettered access to the ballot box.28
After the murder of activists in Mississippi and the bloodshed
during the March on Selma in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson, himself
a former segregationist with a caustic mouth, used the bully pulpit to push

for a new piece of legislation aimed directly at "banish[ing] the blight of

25

See Ellement, supra note 3, at 265-66 (outlining Jim Crow laws suppressing vote); see

also Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (showing why VRA was needed to deal with Jim Crow
laws). But see James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903) (holding Congress did not have
Fifteenth Amendment authority to provide remedy in Kentucky). Bowman is interesting in that it
uses similar Catch-22 reasoning that Justice Ginsburg described in Chief Justice Roberts' Shelby
opinion. See Bowman, 190 U.S. at 139-40; see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612,
2649-50 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Bowman, the defendant was charged with bribing
African Americans so that they might not cast their ballot in a Congressional election. See
Bowman, 190 U.S. at 139. According to the Supreme Court, the individual in Kentucky was
acting as just that, an individual. See id. He was not representing the state of Kentucky, and was
not acting under the color of state law or action. See id. (requiring satisfactory nexus between
state preventing fundamental political right to blacks and individual briber).
26 See Ellement, supra note 3, at 265-66 (detailing Civil Rights Acts passed in 1957 and
1960
with minimal effect).
27 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012); see also Ellement, supra note 3, at 267. The Civil Rights
Act of 1957 placed the Justice Department in a position similar to private and public litigators
after the Shelby County decision. Ellement, supra note 3, at 267. Individual lawsuits require high
costs associated with labor, and trying to defend the VRA in multiple jurisdictions within just one
state, never mind multiple states, could prove too large a task. See id.; see also Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) ("Section 5...a response to a common practice in some
jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting
laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down."); Voting Rights Act After the Supreme
Court's Decision in Shelby County: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution and
Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Prof. Spencer Overton) (articulating impact on political operatives and litigators
after Shelby County decision); Ellement, supra note 3, at 268 (noting states can pass and
implement statutes quicker than federal enforcement procedures); infra note 33 and
accompanying text; cf Tomas Lopez, 'Shelby County:' One Year Later, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE (June 24, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later
(assessing Shelby County impact in Texas and other preclearance states one year after decision).
28 See Ellement, supra note 3, at 267 (describing legislation passed during Civil Rights Era
from 1950s to mid-1960s).
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racial discrimination in voting, which had infected the electoral process in
parts of [the] country for nearly a centuy, 29 After considerable opposition
from Southern States and Democratic Boll weevils, the Act passed "the

House of Representatives by a vote of 328-74, and the Senate by a vote of
79-18."3 The Act was wide in its scope, nullifying polls taxes and literacy
tests, permitting federal officers to oversee state elections and ensure that
all individuals were properly registered and allowed to vote. 3 ' The VRA
barred any state from developing regulations that would create
"qualification[s] or prerequisites" to voting. 32
Whereas the Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorized the Attorney

General to bring individual suits for individual offenses, the VRA
empowered the Justice Department and the federal government to nip voter
suppression in the bud.33
The preclearance requirement has always

29

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (articulating purpose of VRA),

abrogated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see Special Message to the
Congress: The American Promise, 1 PuB. PAPERS 281 (March 15, 1965) (arguing for passage of
VRA); History ofFederal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 15 (naming various acts of violence as

catalyst for political action on voting rights). President Johnson eloquently stated:
[Ilt was last week in Selma, Alabama. There, long-suffering men and women
peacefully protested the denial of their rights as Americans. Many were brutally
assaulted. One good man, a man of God, was killed. There is no cause for pride in
what has happened in Selma. There is no cause for self-satisfaction in the long denial
of equal rights of millions of Americans. But there is cause for hope and for faith in
our democracy in what is happening here tonight. For the cries of pain and the hymns
and protests of oppressed people have summoned into convocation all the majesty of
this great Government the Government of the greatest Nation on earth. Our mission
is at once the oldest and the most basic of this country: to right wrong, to do justice, to
serve man .... The issue of equal rights for American Negroes is such an issue. And
should we defeat every enemy, should we double our wealth and conquer the stars, and
still be unequal to this issue, then we will have failed as a people and as a nation.
Special Message to the Congress, supra;see Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308 (discussing purpose for
Voting Rights Act to combat "blight of racial discrimination"); see also Ellement, supra note 3, at
267 (discussing federal regulations to encourage and enforce nondiscriminatory voting practices
in states).
30 Ellement, supra note 3, at 267; see H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 37 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2491 (raising Constitutional concerns between state sovereignty and federal
power). "[T]he right to vote is not absolute and the States under our system of government have
the exclusive power to fix and determine qualifications. The Federal Government has no power
to bestow upon any person the right to vote in any State." H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 37 (1965),
reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2491.
31 See H.R. REP. No 89-439, 37 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2437
(reviewing Congress's VRA goals); H.R. 6400, 89th Cong. (1965) (enacted) (laying out
framework for oversight of state elections).
32 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (2012); Ellement, supra note 3, at 267 (outlining framework of
VRA).
33 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (writing on Congress taking notice of

62

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XX

generated the most consternation because it shifted the balance in power
towards the federal government in overseeing a traditionally and
exclusively state prerogative.34 The Supreme Court, under the Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement clause in Katzenbach, ratified this unprecedented
exercise of congressional authority.3 5 Unlike previous legislation aimed at

bad actors tactics in drafting VRA). The Court noted:
Section 5 was a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one
step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as
the old ones had been struck down. That practice had been possible because each new
law remained in effect until the Justice Department or private plaintiffs were able to
sustain the burden of proving that the new law, too, was discriminatory.... Congress
therefore decided, as the Supreme Court held it could, to shift the advantage of time
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim, by freezing election
procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be
nondiscriminatory.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 57-58); see S. REP. NO.
94-295 (1975), reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774 (outlining intent of Congress to get ahead of
ever-changing state regulations); H.R. REP. NO. 91-397 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3277 (same); S. REP. NO. 89-162 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508 (same); H.R. REP.
NO. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437 (same); H.R. REP. NO. 94-196 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3277 (same); see also Hearing, supra note 27, (statement of

Spencer Overton) (commenting on increased cost to litigate Section 5 cases after Shelby County).
Prof. Overton stated that "[a]nother problem is that lawsuits can take years. Too often, lawsuits
don't stop unfair voting rules before they are used in elections and harm voters. In contrast,
preclearance was relatively quick, efficient, inexpensive. Preclearance also generally prevented
discriminatory practices before they became effective." See Hearing, supra note 27, (statement
of Spencer Overton). Prof. Overton also noted that in poorer counties like Nueces County, Texas,
the Latino population has exploded, growing to 56% of the population. See id. The costs of
litigation for the Department of Justice were sometimes in the millions, fees that are entirely
unavailable to an impoverished population. See id. See generally EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS
E.

WILLGING, LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATh ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (Federal Judicial Center 2010),

available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costcivl.pdf/$file/costcivl.pdf (studying
increase in costs to litigate generally).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. X (establishing federal government only has those powers delegated
by Constitution); § 10304(a) (requiring states to prove to purpose and effect). Section 10304(a)
requires each sovereign state to report and justify their actions to the federal Executive or Judicial
branch that "such qualification, perquisite, standard, practice, or procedure neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color...." § 10304(a); see South Carolina v. KatzenbaclL 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) ("[Congress]
shift[ed] the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to is victim...."),
abrogatedby Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see also H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at
23-34 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2470-71 (arguing VRA impedes state
sovereignty and upsets federalism construction). Critics claimed that the VRA "attempt[ed] to
remedy discrimination by discriminatory means." See H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 23-34 (1965),
reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2470-71.
35 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337 (upholding VRA as means of enforcing Fifteenth
Amendment); see H.R. REP. No. 109-478, 2 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 623
(citing Katzenbach as dicta for Congressional oversight of state elections administration and
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leveling the playing field and ensuring a purer democratic process, the
VRA did not require litigation after the exploitive measure had been

enacted, rather it forced the jurisdictions covered under the Section 4
formula to prove their changes were not based on race to comply with
Section 5 preclearance.3 6 Furthermore, preclearance applied only to certain
jurisdictions with a pernicious prior record of voter suppression. 37
B. Preclearanceand Options Affording to the States
For any jurisdiction covered by the Section 4 formula to implement
a change to its election procedures, the jurisdiction would have to either

seek a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia or submit the change to the Department
of Justice-specifically the Attorney General-for authorization.3 8 If a

jurisdiction had implemented a poll tax, literacy test, or had fewer than fifty
regulation).
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2012); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431-32

(D.D.C. 2011) (reviewing reasoning for and execution of Section 5 preclearance).
17 See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012) (reserving preclearance to certain jurisdictions);
Ellement, supra note 3, at 268-69 ("[T]he coverage formula is meant to subject those jurisdictions
with a history of racial discrimination to the strictures of the preclearance requirement.").
Preclearance was restricted to jurisdictions with prerequisite tests or devices such as poll taxes
or literacy tests and less than 50% of eligible voters either registered or participating in the most
recent presidential election. See § 10303(b) (providing criteria for application of preclearance);
cf Harperv. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding poll taxes in Virginia
and United States unconstitutional). The VRA itself did not explicitly outlaw poll taxes, but it did
instruct the Attorney General to test the constitutionality of such actions before the Court. See §
10306 (giving Attorney General authority to institute safeguards preventing use of poll taxes
impairing voting rights). Justice Earl Warren in Katzenbach described the impact of the tests and
devices on African Americans: "more than two-thirds of the adult Negroes were illiterate while
less than one-quarter of the adult whites were unable to read or write." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at
311. The Katzenbach Court quoted South Carolina Senator Ben Tillman as stating, "[t]he only
thing we can do as patriots and as statesmen is to take from the ignorant blacks every ballot that
we can under the laws of our national government." Id at 310 n.9; see Texas v. Holder, 888 F.
Supp. 2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2012) (writing about historical viciousness with which white
supremacists abridged minority voting rights), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013); History of
Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 15 (reviewing history of racial discrimination in voting
and disparities in minority participation); see also JurisdictionsPreviously CoveredBy Section 5,
supra note 15 (listing every jurisdiction covered and bailed out since 1965).
38 See § 10304(a) (describing procedure for alteration of voting qualifications); 28 C.F.R. §
51.11 (2012) (codifying that jurisdictions can seek declaratory judgment after submission to
Justice Department); Ellement, supra note 3, at 268-69 (revealing preclearance procedure for
covered jurisdiction); see also Shelby Cnty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 431 (allowing jurisdictions to
appeal Attorney General objection to District Court); Jocelyn F. Benson, A SharedExistence: The
Current Compatibility of the Equal Protection Clause and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 88
NEB. L. REv. 124, 129 (2009) (studying most efficient means for covered jurisdiction to
implement changes).
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percent of its eligible voting citizens registered and participating in the
most recent presidential election, the jurisdiction (state, county,

municipality, voting subdivision) would be a covered preclearance
jurisdiction.39
In lieu of the heated political and ideological debate surrounding
the Section 4 formula and Section 5 preclearance, the drafters of the VRA
originally imposed a five-year time limit on the sections and inserted a
bailout provision for covered jurisdiction. 40 A successful bailout occurs
after a covered jurisdiction proves before the District Court or Attorney
General that they have not engaged in practices enumerated under the
Section 4 formula. 4' The covered jurisdictions "must have eliminated those

39 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (citing policies for DOJ to enforce VRA); see
also Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (recognizing speed at which legislatures subverted minority
voting before federal response could be developed).
Crafty legislatures suppressed African
American voters through "insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain
parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution...."
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309; see Persily, supra note 4, at 177 (noting unique role federal
government played in preclearance states' election administration).

No other statute applies only to a subset of the country and requires covered states and
localities to get permission from the federal government before implementing a certain
type of law. Such a remedy was necessary because case-by-case adjudication of voting
rights lawsuits proved incapable of reining in craft Dixiecrat legislatures determined to
deprive African Americans of their right to vote, regardless of what a federal court
might order.
Persily, supra note 4, at 177.
40 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301); Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, Terminating coverage under
the
Act's
special
provision,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,

http://www.jusice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/sec 4.php#bailout (last visited Dec. 28, 2014); see also
Ellement supra note 3, at 269; Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing
Democracry?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the
Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1644, 1675 (2009) (noting

change in election law dicta in early decisions from Roberts Court). The Roberts Court eschewed
the traditional balancing tests between the impact of a measure on the voter and the state's
plenary prerogative in regulating and administering elections employed by the federal bench early
in his first term. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra, at 1675. Now, the Court would favor as
applied challenges, greatly increasing the evidentiary hurdle a challenger must clear to
successfully challenge a state action. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra, at 1675; see also Katz,
supra note 6, at 1615-16 (arguing Roberts Court narrows "longstanding and more recent
precedent" in Election Law jurisprudence).
41 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 40 (listing criteria set forth to
bailout of
preclearance). A jurisdiction seeking to bailout must establish that in the last ten years,
No test or device has been used within the jurisdiction for the purpose or with the
effect of voting discrimination; All changes affecting voting have been reviewed under
Section 5 prior to their implementation; No change affecting voting has been the
subject of an objection by the Attorney General or the denial of a Section 5 declaratory
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voting procedures and methods of elections that inhibit or dilute equal
access to the electoral process. 4 2 Many jurisdictions have successfully
bailed out using the criteria issued by the Supreme Court in Northwest
Austin 43
.
C. The Lone Star State's Voter IdentificationStatute
In January 2011, the Texas legislature enacted, and the following
May Governor Rick Perry signed Senate Bill 14 ("SB 14"), an act "relating
to requirement to vote, including presenting proof of identification . . .
[and] providing criminal penalties."4 4 SB 14 established a more "stringent"
regulatory scheme for elections in Texas. 45 Whereas under previous Texas
judgment from the District of Columbia district court; There have been no adverse
judgments in lawsuits alleging voting discrimination; There have been no consent
decrees or agreements that resulted in the abandonment of a discriminatory voting
practice; There are no pending lawsuits that allege voting discrimination; and Federal
examiners have not been assigned; There have been no violations of the Constitution or
federal, state or local laws with respect to voting discrimination unless the jurisdiction
establishes that any such violations were trivial, were promptly corrected, and were not
repeated.
Id.(listing statutory criteria for bailout).
42

See id.; see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. I v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 215-26 (2009)

(enumerating guidance on bailout criteria for covered jurisdictions).
43 See Jurisdictions Previously Covered By Section 5, supra note 15 (listing every
jurisdiction covered and bailed out since 1965); see also Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, supra

note 40 (providing for termination of coverage for "good behavior").
44 See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115-17 (2012) (reviewing history of Texas's
Voter ID Law), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). Prior to SB 14, Texas did have a form of voter
identification. See id.
at 115. Texas voters had to file a registration application with the board of
elections registrars in their county. See id.The application required a name, birthday, and a
sworn affidavit that the individual was a U.S. citizen See id; see also TEx. ELEC. CODE § 13.002
(2012). If their application were approved, the voter would receive a certificate without a
photograph identifying the individual voter from the registrar that had to be presented at the
ballot box. See ELEC. §§ 13.142, 13.144. Voters would not be turned away at the polling
location if they brought an affidavit swearing that they did not have their registrar certificate, or if
they presented some other form of accepted identification. See ELEC. § 63.008. Other forms of
identification accepted by Texas were "birth certificates, expired and non-expired driver's
licenses, U.S. passports, U.S. citizenship papers, utility bills, 'official mail addressed to the
person . . . from a governmental entity,' any 'form of identification containing the person's
photograph that establishes the person's identity,' and 'any other form of identification prescribed
by the secretary of state."' See ELEC. § 63.0101; see also Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115
(describing Texas policy under SB 14).
45 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (describing SB 14 as more strict than preexisting
statute); see also All Things Considered: Texas' Voter ID Law Creates A Problem for Some

Women (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2013) (inferring that Voter ID in Texas is over inclusive to
minorities and women). Judge Sandra Watts was forced to cast a provisional ballot because the
voting registration lists had her middle name listed, but she took her maiden name as her middle
name upon marrying her husband. See All Things Considered, supra (demonstrating restrictive
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law voters could produce any form of identification, now their accepted
identification had to include a photograph.46 This included the certificate
from the county elections registrar.47 The IDs had to be current, and the
polling location would not accept any form of identification that had
expired more than sixty days before the election. 48 Texas's Voter ID

statute increased the number of acceptable identification forms for
presentation at the ballot, and charged the Texas Department of Public
Safety (DPS) with responding to voter's requests for identification. 49 If
someone lacks one of these forms of identification, they must report in
person to a regional DPS office to obtain an electronic identification

certificate in order to vote.50 While the statute does not permit the DPS to
collect fees for these forms of identification, the material required to verify
identity does involve fees.5

application of Texas's voter ID law); see also Lucy McCalmont, Jim Wright denied voter ID
card, POLITICO (Nov. 4, 2013 at 6:15 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/jim-wrightvoter-id-law-texas-99291.html (describing former U.S. House Speaker being denied voting card
under Texas voter ID statute).
46 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (noting changes included requiring photo ID); see also
ELEC. § 63.0101 (discussing what documentation is acceptable for proof of identification).
47 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115; see also ELEC. § 63.0101.
48 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115; see also ELEC. § 63.0101.
49 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (laying out proper identification forms and DPS as
agency in charge of providing lDs). Now Texas polling places will accept a license to carry a
concealed handgun, a U.S. Military ID card, a U.S. citizenship certificate containing a
photograph, and a U.S. passport in addition to a Texas driver's license of personal ID card issued
by DPS. See id; see also ELEC. § 63.0101.
50 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (blending Voter ID regulations with Texas
Transportation Department and Administrative Code); TEx. TRANSP. CODE § 521A.001(e)
(2012); 37 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 15.182 (2012) (stating applications must provide necessary
documents for election identification certificate).
51 See TRANSP. § 521A.001(e). Once at the regional DPS office, the voter will have to
present a valid birth certificate, a court document showing an official name or gender change,
U.S. citizenship or naturalization papers without a photo identification, school records, Social
Security cards, pilot's licenses, or an out-of-state driver's license. See 37 TEx. ADMIN. CODE
§ 15.182(3)-(4). Judge Tatel in Texas v. Holderexpounded on the implications of the primary and
secondary identification form requirements:
EIC applicants-i.e., would-be voters who possess none of these underlying forms of
identification will have to bear out-of-pocket costs. For Texas-born voters who have
changed neither their name nor gender, the cheapest way to obtain the required
documentation will be to order a certified copy of their birth certificate from the Texas
Bureau of Vital Statistics at a cost of $22 .... Actually obtaining [emphasis omitted]
a legal change of name and/or gender costs far more at least $152 . . . . More
expensive options exist as well, ranging from $30 for an "expedited" birth certificate
order all the way up to $354 for a copy of U.S. citizenship or naturalization papers.
See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 116. But see Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (casting poll taxes as unconstitutional abuses of state against lawful voters).
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Two months after Governor Perry signed the new regulatory
scheme into law, Texas filed for preclearance with the Attorney General.52
The Justice Department requested that Texas show how many voters lacked
a driver's license or personal ID card, and how many of those individuals
were minorities.53 In March 2012, Attorney General Holder rejected
Texas's application for preclearance after the state submitted incomplete
and unreliable estimates of Hispanic voters who may have been impacted
by SB 14 . The Justice Department determined that "Hispanic registered

voters are more than twice as likely as non-Hispanic registered voters to
lack" the required documentation to obtain an electronic identification card
and that Texas "failed to show that the availability of purportedly 'free'
EIC would mitigate the impact on minority voters. ,55 Under preclearance,
the Attorney General was only required to show a discriminatory effect on
minority voters, so Attorney General Holder declined to determine whether
or not Texas enacted SB 14 with a discriminatory purpose. 56
After the denial by the Attorney General, Texas filed suit for a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia with hopes of implementing SB 14 before the November 2012
elections.57 Texas argued that there was a compelling state interest in

52 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (outlining process Texas as preclearance jurisdiction

went through for federal authorization).
53 See id.(requiring Texas show SB 14 justification for restricting voter access). For
preclearance, Texas must show that its voter ID law "neither has the purpose nor will have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race..." Id. (allowing for extension
to 60-day requirement when requests for supplemental information are made).
54 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 117. Texas gave the Justice Department a list of 795,955
registered voters who could not be corroborated on the DPS's databases for driver's licenses and
personal ID cards. See id. (detailing nearly 40%, or 304,389 voters were Hispanic).
55 See id. Attorney General Holder identified the birth certificate as the least expensive
option for a prospective voter to obtain an Election Identification Certificate, and that would run
the voter twenty-two dollars. See id.at 117. The prospective voter would also have to drive to a
regional DPS office. See id. The trouble with the in-person requirement in § 63.0101 is that
there are no offices equipped to process a driver's license application in 81 of Texas's 254
counties. See id.at 118. These offices typically have shorter operational hours, meaning that if a
prospective voter could take time off of work and use a vehicle to drive, that voter still may not
be able to receive the necessary identification forms needed to cast a ballot. See id. at 117-18.
56 See id. at 118 (declining Texas's request for preclearance on SB 14).
" See id.at 118-19 (noting Texas's urgency seeking relief in order to impose voter ID prior
to presidential election). Texas filed a request for an "expedited litigation schedule" and the
district court granted it before the United State answered Texas's amended complaint. See id.at
119 (citing Shelby County and Northwest Austin as support for allowing expedited schedule); see
also Shelby County v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding facial constitutionality
of Section 5); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (granting
preclearance structure critical attention). Given Section 5's "substantial federalism costs" as
described in Northwest Austin, and the doctrine of equal sovereignty, the district court believed
that because Section 5 covered only certain jurisdictions, it violated Texas's equal sovereignty
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combatting voter fraud, and that SB 14 was directly and narrowly tailored

to serving that legitimate state interest.5 8 More specifically, Texas argued
that Voter ID laws could not "abridge the right to vote," or change the
position of minorities in voting, because the laws represent a "minor
inconvenience," resting entirely on whether an individual chooses to
participate. 59 Moreover, Texas contended that a recent voter ID decision
by the Supreme Court controlled the case, and since that statute was upheld
Texas should be allowed preclearance to implement SB 14.60 The United
States-citing the dearth of voter fraud examples contained in evidence
introduced by Texas-argued that SB 14 was a vehicle for suppressing
minority vote and contained no compelling state interest. 61 Furthermore,
the United States countered that Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board was distinguishable because it was a "facial challenge to a voter ID
law enacted by a state not covered by section 5 .62 This impacts which

party carries the burden of proving63that the statute carries or does not carry
a discriminatory purpose or intent.
The district court rejected

Texas's

assertion regarding the

rights. See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (emphasizing other non-covered jurisdictions and
states permitted to implement voter identification laws without federal scrutiny); see also Coyle
v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1911) (noting doctrine of equal sovereignty when states are
admitted to Union). Equal sovereignty was not incorporated into Article IV of the Constitution,
which merely read, "new states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union." See Coyle,
221 U.S. at 566; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
58 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 121 ("Texas also argues that record evidence affinnatively
proves that SB 14 will have no discriminatory effect.").
59 See id. at 127 (reviewing Texas's argument in Findings of Fact presented to court); see
also 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012). Texas argued that voter ID laws have no bearing on turnout,
be it to increase or decrease participation. See id.at 123. So, if the laws do not have any bearing
on turnout, correspondingly, the laws will not impact minorities. See id.at 127.
60 See id.
at 128. Judge Tatel summarized Texas's argument:
From this, Texas urges us to draw three conclusions: (1) photo ID laws ultimately
prevent very few people from voting; (2) photo ID laws have no disproportionate effect
on racial minorities; and (3) disparate ID possession rates have little effect on turnout.
We reject these proposed findings because the circumstances in Georgia and Indiana
are significantly different from those in Texas.
See id.at 128; see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202-03 (2009)
(holding voter ID laws impose minimal First and Fourteenth Amendment burdens on voters).
61 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (outlining parties' arguments).
62 See id.
at 124-25 (reviewing government's counterargument before District Court). Since
Marion County, Indiana was not a covered jurisdiction, the challengers to Indiana's voter ID law
bore the burden of proving the retrogressive effect. See Crawford,553 U.S. at 200. Texas-as a
preclearance jurisdiction must show "that SB 14 lacks discriminatory purpose and retrogressive
effect." See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (quoting Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538
(1973)).
63 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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theoretically minimal impact voter ID laws has on turnout because the
study produced by Texas was not dispositive.64 The panel found that Texas
misread Section 5 of the VRA in their argument, and that if the minimalism
65
argument held it would exempt voter ID laws from Section 5 scrutiny.
Interestingly, the district court rejected the arguments regarding Crawford
by both parties.66 The government's argument against using Crawfordwas
inaccurate because the decision allowed Indiana to combat voter fraud
without evidence of the fraud existing and in determining that minimal
inconveniences to participation are permissible 6. 7 The court did accept the

government's burden of proof argument, and rejected Texas's position that
Crawford completely governed this case because of Texas's status as a
preclearance jurisdiction under Section 5 of the VRA.68
Ultimately, the court rejected all of the evidence provided by the
parties, and denied preclearance to Texas because it failed to show that SB
14 would not have a retrogressive effect on racial minorities.6 9 The court

64

See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (noting lack of consensus on voter ID impact on

turnout). "We are unable to credit this line of argument because the effect of voter ID laws on
turnout remains a matter of dispute among social scientists." See id. Essentially, Texas and the
United States introduced competing political and social science theories, and the court held that
they canceled each other out. See id.
61 See id. at 142-43 (finding Texas's argument "entirely unpersuasive."). The court noted
that the pernicious prerequisite devices that gave rise to the VRA in the 1960s were written
racially neutral to provide a loophole to previous Civil Rights Acts. See id at 142 (noting
"notorious devices" such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and grandfather clauses). As such, the court
rejected Texas's argument that Section 5 applied only to voting changes that directly violated the
Fifteenth Amendment. See id. at 143 (reasoning Texas's interpretation of Section 5 goes against
its very purpose).
66 See id. at 125 (stating "the correct answer lies somewhere between these two positions").
67 See id. at 125-26 (allowing legitimate state interest "without any concrete evidence of a
problem" in Indiana and Texas); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203
(2009). The court noted that preserving the integrity of the voting process was a legitimate state
concern, and denying that interest to Texas because of preclearance was violative of the equal
sovereignty rights. See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203; see also Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 125.
Furthermore, "according to Crawford, there are certain responsibilities and inconveniences that
citizens must bear in order to exercise their right to vote, and a one-time trip to the driver's
license office is, in most situations, simply one of those responsibilities." See Holder, 888 F.
Supp. at 126; see also Crawford,553 U.S. at 203; E. Earl Parson, The Persistence ofRacial Bias
In Voting: Voter ID, The New BattlegroundforPretextualRace Neutrality, 8 J. L. SOCIETY 75, 95
(Summer 2007) (discussing opposition to new measures citing lack of evidence justifying
restrictions).
68 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (positioning analysis between poles presented by
parties). Crawford was analyzing the impact of voter ID on all voters in Indiana. See Crawford,
553 U.S at 203.
Texas must prove "that SB 14 lacks retrogressive effect even if a
disproportionate number of minority voters in the state currently lack photo ID. But to do so,
Texas must prove that these would-be voters could easily obtain SB 14-qualifying ID without
cost or major inconvenience." See id.
69 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (finding Texas failed to meet its burden).

70

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XX

rejected further studies presented by both the federal government and the

state of Texas. 70 SB 14 presented a bifurcated cost to low-income minority
voters who disproportionately lacked the materials required by the statute

to obtain an electronic identification card. 7 1 The court also noted that
Texas could not rebut the lack of regional DPS offices, increasing the
burden on minorities who may have to travel outside of their home county
to obtain an electronic identification card.72 The district court described the
entirety of Texas's argument for implementing SB 14 prior to the
November elections as "unpersuasive, invalid, or both., 73 As a covered
jurisdiction seeking preclearance, the court found Texas's argument
unpersuasive, that SB 14 would disproportionately74 affect impoverished
minorities, and denied SB 14 from going into effect.
III. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PRACTICE AND THE
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. The Path Leading to Shelby County
The
of 1965, but
preclearance
legislation.

crown jewel of the Civil Rights Era was the Voting Rights Act
Congress imposed a five-year time limit on the efficacy of the
requirement so that the body could review the progress of the
For the first time, Congress passed a law in 1965 that applied

Notwithstanding, there was uncontested evidence that Texas's minority population lives
disproportionately in poverty, and since SB 14 has an outsized influence on the impoverished, the
law has a retrogressive effect. See id (noting case did not turn exclusively on burden of proof
issue).
70 See id at 130. Texas study of ID possession rates was comprised by a 2% response rate to
a phone survey and improperly weighted figures for African Americans. See id at 131. Dr.
Ansolabehere's study for the U.S. was unreliable because it only studied the possession rate for
two of the five permissible forms of ID, and included deceased voters. See id. at 133-35.
71 See id. at 128-29 (citing purchasing materials cost and traveling to DPS regional office to
verify identity). The court compared the costs of obtaining the cheapest options for identity
verification in Texas to Indiana. See id In Texas it was twenty-two dollars, while in Indiana
depending on the county the cost ranged from three dollars to twelve dollars. See id; see also
Crawford,553 U.S. at 198.
72 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 128-29. The federal government showed that "81 Texas
counties have no [DPS] office, and 34 additional counties have [DPS] offices open two days per
week or less." Id. In Crawford, Indiana voters faced no such travel burden. See id; Crawford,
557 U.S. at 198. There was an appropriate state office in every county, with a minimal fee. See
supra, note 41 and accompanying text.
73 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 144. Compare Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 119-20, 143-45
(summarizing Texas's "dilatory" approach to litigation), with Katz, supra note 6, at 1623 (noting
difficulties in challenging state statutes without preclearance).
74 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 144 (denying SB 14 authorization to proceed forward).
75 See Persily, supra note 4, at 177 (describing early years and necessities for passage
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only to portions of the country so that true remedies could be sought to end
the long-standing practice of denying racial minorities the right to vote on
invidious and perniciously discriminatory grounds.76
In 1970, Congress modestly adjusted the preclearance formula and
extended the VRA for five years.77 Congress again reauthorized the VRA
in 1975 for seven years. Like the 1970 reauthorization, this Congress
moved up the date for measuring covered jurisdictions to the 1972
election. 78 The 1982 reauthorization did nothing to the coverage formula,

imposed on VRA). Persily goes further, saying that "Congress intended the expiration of Section
5 to force the nation to take stock of its progress, or lack thereof, in achieving equal voting rights,
as well as to adapt the law to new challenges and changing political realities." Id.; see American
Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut, Issues, The Voting Rights Act at Forty A Shining Moment
in the Conscience of Man, https://www.acluct.org/updates/the-voting-rights-act-at-forty-ashining-moment-in-the-conscience-of-man/ (Jan. 1, 2006) (quoting President Reagan describing
right to vote as "crown-jewel" of American liberties).
76 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (stating that Congress's intent was for
limited applicability of Sections 4 and 5); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193, 199 (2009) ("§§ 4 and 5 [of the VRA]...were temporary provisions...expected to
be in effect for.. five years."); Persily, supra note 4, at 177 (noting VRA's unique and
unparalleled federal construction). Prior to the VRA, no statute passed by the Congress had ever
precluded state and municipal governments from enacting bills to regulate activities within their
time-honored plenary powers, of which voting was one. See Persily, supra note 4, at 177; see
also 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012) (requiring qualifying § 4 jurisdictions receive authorization before
implementing changes). "Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting" that was implemented had to be cleared under the VRA. See
Persily, supra note 4, at 177.
77 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620 ("In 1970, Congress reauthorized the Act for another
five years, and extended the coverage formula in § 4(b) to jurisdictions that had a voting test and
less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout as of 1968."). The original legislation used the
November 1964 elections as benchmark. See id. at 2619. The reauthorization also extended the
ban on tests and devices to the rest of the country, and it was these changes that led to the
inclusion of certain counties in California, New Hampshire, and New York. See id. at 2620.
78 See id. at 2620 (extending VRA with adjustments and amendments to 1982). Congress
also changed the definition of a "test or device" to ban English-only voting materials in
jurisdictions with more than five percent of citizens eligible to vote who spoke English as a
second language. Id. More counties in California and New York were added, along with
counties in Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, and South Dakota. Id. The entirety of Alaska and
Arizona, as well as the great state of Texas became subject to preclearance. Id. Sections 2 and 5
were "correspondingly amended ... to forbid voting discrimination on the basis of membership
in a language minority group, in addition to discrimination on the basis of race or color." Id.; see
Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?:How Courts Should think about efforts to make it harder to
vote in North Carolinaand Elsewhere, 127 HARv. L. REv. F. 58, 61 (2014) (cutting to issue of
race when white majority legislatures restrict voter access). "[T]he overlap of consideration of
race and party, when a Republican legislature like North Carolina's passes a law making it harder
for some voters to vote, is that a law about party politics or a law about race?" Hasen, supra note
78, at 61. See generally History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 15 (describing
passage of two reauthorizations of VRA). Whereas the original VRA focused primarily on the
plight of African Americans, the Congress "heard extensive testimony about voting
discrimination that had been suffered by Hispanic, Asian and Native American citizens, and the
1975 amendments added protections from voting discrimination for language minority citizens."
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but it did allow political subdivisions to bailout of the Section 4, and-most
significantly-amended Section 2 to not compel a plaintiff to prove
discriminatory purpose. 79 All of these reauthorizations were upheld by the

Supreme Court, passed with a Democratic majority in at least one house of
Congress, and signed into law by Republican Presidents.80 Finally in 2006,

History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 15.
'9 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620 (offering limited Roberts Court discussion of
reauthorization in 1982); History ofFederalVoting Rights Laws, supra note 15 (noting provisions
of 1982 reauthorization). The political subdivision provision for bailout requires that the
applicant "not have used a forbidden test or device, failed to receive preclearance, or lost § 2 suit,
in the ten years prior to seeking bailout." See History of FederalVoting Rights Laws, supra note
15; see also Beer v.United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (noting Congress accounted for state
actors circumventing federal responses to voter suppression). Section 5 was a response to a
common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing
new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down. See Texas v.
Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying federal government demand for all
'legislative acts' or motivations with respect to SB 14), vacated, 133 S.Ct. 2886 (2013); see also
Hearing, supra note 27 (statement of Prof. Spencer Overton) (commenting on increased cost to
litigate § 5 cases after Shelby County). Prof. Overton stated that "[a]nother problem is that
lawsuits can take years. Too often, lawsuits don't stop unfair voting rules before they are used in
elections and harm voters. In contrast, preclearance was relatively quick, efficient, inexpensive.
Preclearance also generally prevented discriminatory practices before they became effective."
See Hearing, supra note 27 (statement of Prof. Spencer Overton); see also Order at 9, Perez v.
Texas, No. 11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR (W.D.Tex. Sept. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Order] ("[A]nother
round of fact and expert discovery may be necessary to adequately prepare.. for second trial...").
The case involved a lawsuit by Latino voting advocacy groups and members of Congress against
a redistricting plan implemented by the Texas Legislature after the 2010 Census. See Order,
supra, at 2-3. Judge Xavier Rodriguez advised "additional fact witnesses... will need to testify in
person, if possible, or by video deposition if they are unable to testify in person. There will be
additional documentary evidence, including approximately 400 exhibits that were previously used
in the D.C. preclearance proceedings. Evidentiary challenges will need to be resolved." See id. at
19.
'o See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620-21 (citing Supreme Court cases upholding
reauthorization provisions); see also Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (upholding
reauthorization of VRA), abrogatedon othergrounds by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612
(2013); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (same), abrogatedon other grounds
by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973)
(same), abrogatedon othergrounds by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013); Timeline:
A History of the Voting Rights Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/timeline-history-voting-rightsact (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (proving timeline for major events in history of VRA). In
extending the VRA, President Nixon emphasized its significance, stating "the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 has opened participation in the political process." See Timeline: A History of the Voting
Rights Act, supra (quoting President Nixon on signing amendments to VRA reauthorizing Act);
see also Remarks Upon Signing a Bill Extending the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 2 PUB. PAPERS
477 (Aug. 6, 1975), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid-5157 ("The right to
vote is at the very foundation of our American system, and nothing must interfere with this very
precious right....
In the past decade, the voting rights of millions and millions of Americans have
been protected and our system of government has been strengthened immeasurably. The bill that I
will sign today extends the ...provisions to bar discrimination against Spanish-speaking
Americans, American Indians, Alaskan natives, and Asian Americans. Further, this bill will
permit private citizens, as well as the Attorney General, to initiate suits to protect the voting rights
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the 111 th Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for twentyfive years. Shortly thereafter the Northwest Austin Utility District brought
suit, and the Supreme Court would fire its warning shot across the bow at
the standards of the Voting Rights Act.8'
of citizens.... There must be no question whatsoever about the right of each eligible American,
each eligible citizen to participate in our elective process. The extension of this act will help to
ensure that right."); Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 1 PUB.
PAPERS
(June
29,
available
1982),
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.phppid-42688&st-&stl("[Citizens must have
complete confidence in the sanctity of their right to vote, and that's what this legislation is all
about. It provides confidence that constitutional guarantees are being upheld and that no vote
counts more than another. To so many of our people-our Americans of Mexican descent, our
black Americans this measure is as important symbolically as it is practically. It says to every
individual, 'Your [sic] vote is equal; your vote is meaningful; your vote is your constitutional
right.' I've pledged that as long as I'm in a position to uphold the Constitution, no barrier will
come between our citizens and the voting booth. And this bill is a vital part of fulfilling that
pledge.").
" See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621 (reauthorizing VRA without any amendments to
coverage formula); see also Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. 193, at 200-01 (challenging facial
constitutionality of VRA on political subdivision grounds). The Northwest Austin Court noted
that during the reauthorization process, Congress "amassed a sizable record." See Nw. Austin,
557 U.S. at 205 (emphasizing Fifteenth Amendment empowers Congress, not Judiciary to
determine necessary legislation for its enforcement); see also Persily, supra note 4, at 182-83
(discussing reauthorization process). The 2006 reauthorization process began in the House in
October 2005, in the Senate in April 2006, and both houses held hearings into the summer. See
Persily, supra note 4, at 182-185 (noting reauthorization was passed 390-33 in House and 98-0 in
Senate). Persily also believed that racial discrimination in voting had adapted to the new federal
role in election administration, and "[t]he most salient threats to minority voting had evolved
beyond the categories and geography contemplated by the VRA. Nevertheless, the fear and
uncertainty of what the world would be like without it allowed transformation only in the
direction of restoring the Act to its original meaning." Persily, supra note 4, at 179; see Persily &
Rosenberg, supra note 40, at 1675 (concluding with challenge in Northwest Austin on facial
constitutionality). But see Remarks on Signing the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta
Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1448
(Jul.
27,
2006),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.phppid-506&st-&stl(signing reauthorization of
VRA into law without amendment).
The right of ordinary men and women to determine their own political future lies at the
heart of the American experiment, and it is a right that has been won by the sacrifice of
patriots. The Declaration of Independence was born on the stand for liberty taken at
Lexington and Concord. The amendments to our Constitution that outlawed slavery
and guaranteed the right to vote came at the price of a terrible civil war.... In four
decades since the Voting Rights Act was first passed, we've made progress toward
equality, yet the work for a more perfect union is never ending. We'll continue to
build on the legal equality won by the civil rights movement to help ensure that every
person enjoys the opportunity that this great land of liberty offers. And that means a
decent education and a good school for every child, a chance to own their own home or
business, and the hope that comes from knowing that you can rise in our society by
hard work and God-given talents.
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B. Welcome to Shelby County
Shelby County, Alabama initiated litigation against the federal
government after the 2006 reauthorization. 82
Since the 1982
reauthorization, Alabama had among the highest rates of successful Section
2 lawsuits despite being under "the restraining effect of §5." 83 Shelby
County did not seek a bailout, but rather brought a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5, and sought a permanent injunction
against its applicability to the county.8 4 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia found that the sizable record gathered by the Congress
was sufficient to justify the reauthorization of Section 5 and not requiring
substantial changes to the Section 4(b) formula.85 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, concluding that
Section 2 litigation remained inadequate in the covered jurisdictions to
protect the rights of minority workers, and that Section 5 was therefore still
necessary.86 The Court of Appeals was not as certain about the unique
federalism construction "for singling out the covered jurisdictions,"
however the data showed that successful Section 2 suits combined with
Section 5 deterrence evidence
"single[d] out jurisdictions in which
87
concentrated.
is
discrimination
Justice Roberts noted that in Northwest Austin, the Court expressed

serious doubts about the Constitutionality of the coverage formula because
it still subjected a jurisdiction to preclearance based on behaviors from the

82 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612-13 (describing origins of lawsuit).
83 See id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (linking Alabama's troubled recent history with

its deplorable past in voting rights). Justice Ginsburg described Alabama's success in ensuring
the right to vote for racial minorities with thinly veiled contempt: "even while subject to the
retraining effect of §5, Alabama was found to have 'den[ied] or abridge[d] voting rights 'on
account of race or color' more frequently than nearly all other States in the Union." Id.(quoting
52 U.S.C. §10301(a)). She began her review of Shelby's preclearance application by reminding
the Court that it was the "Bloody Sunday" showdown between Bull Connor and Freedom
Marchers that proved as the political "catalyst" for the VRA's passage. See id.(reviewing violent
past between activists and anti-civil rights movement); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d
848, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting successful § 2 suits against Alabama);
supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing historical context for VRA).
84 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2621-22 (summarizing facts which brought Shelby County
before Roberts's Court); see also Shelby Chty., 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 508 (D.D.C. 2011)
(reviewing history of suit).
85 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 (summarizing district court's findings); see also
Shelby Chty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (upholding constitutionality of Section 5).
86 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2622 (detailing D.C. Circuit's decision upholding Section
5);see also Shelby Cnty., 679 F. 3d at 873 (upholding Section 5 as necessary).
87 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2622 (outlining D.C. Circuit's reasoning); see also Shelby
Cnty., 679 F. 3d at 379.
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late 1960-70s.8 The Shelby County majority held that the Section 4
coverage formula was unconstitutional, and could "no longer be used as a
basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance." 89 Roberts affirmed the
new as-applied standard of review for Election Law cases originally
propagated in Northwest Austin, "current burdens must be justified by
current needs." 90 In essence, to subject a specific jurisdiction to coverage
must directly relate to the problem that unique coverage seeks to address. 91
The Shelby County decision adopted the Northwest Austin
interpretation of equal sovereignty-a concept rarely used except in cases
dealing with the admission of new states to the Union-to argue that the
Voting Rights Act violates the rights of States to regulate elections under
the Tenth Amendment. 92 The Court used the seminal 1960s decision in
Katzenbach to hold that the doctrine of equal sovereignty can only be
overcome by establishing exceptional current conditions justify
"uncommon exercise[s] of congressional power." 93 Roberts found that the
VRA's success in rooting out invidious racial discrimination in voting
stood as evidence that the unique construction-problematic for equal
sovereignty-was no longer necessary. 94
Roberts argued that the

restrictions in Section 5 or the scope of the Section 4 coverage formula
have not eased, despite the fact that the tests and devices have been banned

since the 1960s. 95 Section 4 cannot be Constitutional under the current
burdens analysis because the data used today is dated and based on
eliminated practices.96 Roberts noted that "history did not end in 1965,"

" See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2615.
89 Id.(reversing D.C. Circuit).
90 See id.; see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)
(discussing Act "imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs").
91 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2616.
92 See id. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009));
see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991); supra note 7 and accompanying text
(articulating shift in policy from state deference to federal role in elections).
9' See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2616; see also South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
334 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). The measures
permitted in Katzenbach "were justified by the 'blight of racial discrimination in voting' that had
'infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century ...
' Shelby Cnty.,
133 S. Ct. at 2616 (stressing need for Court's decision in Katzenbach); see Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
at 308.
94 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2616 (striking down law as burden no longer necessary to
impose on states). "The Act was limited to areas where Congress found evidence of actual voting
discrimination, and the covered jurisdictions shared two characteristics: the use of tests and
devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points
below the national." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 303 (1966)).
9' See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2616; see also Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202.
96 See Shelby Chty., 133 S. Ct. at 2617.
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the times have changed and Congress should revisit the formula used to

enact Section 5 so that it can reflect whatever the conditions of voter
suppression are in this country in the twenty-first century. 97 Finally, it
rejected the assertion that the record compiled by Congress during the 2006
reauthorization process accurately reflects current, pernicious, and
pervasive discrimination. 98 Roberts concluded, "Congress did not use that
record to fashion a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It
instead re-enacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical
relations to the present day. 99
Justice Ginsburg wrote a vigorous dissent, arguing that it was

incumbent on the Court to show deference to "a Congress charged with the
obligation to enforce the post-Civil War amendments by 'appropriate
legislation. ""00 Ginsburg rejected the majority's argument that stated the

Government reverse-engineered the need for the VRA, because "secondgeneration barriers [to voting] come in various forms."' 1°' Despite having
Supreme Court dicta on the side of the dissent, Justice Ginsburg attempted

to show that the justification for the Section 4(b) under the current

9' See id.
98 See id.
99 See id. But see Dylan Matthews, Here'sHow Congress Could Fix The Voting Rights Act,
POST
WONKBLOG
(Jun.
25,
2013,
3:58
PM),

WASHINGTON

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/20 13/06/25/heres-how-congress-could-fixthe-voting-rights-act/ (quoting Prof. Overton) (calling for updated coverage formula that focuses
on recent offenses to minority voting rights); Spencer Overton, How to Update the Voting Rights
Act, DEMOS POLICYSHOP (Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.demos.org/blog/how-update-voting-rightsact (arguing for revival of preclearance based on recent malfeasance and public disclosure); see
also Mike Lillis, Bill would revive the Voting Rights Act, THE HILL FLOOR ACTION BLOG (Jan.
16, 2014, 1:07 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/195698-bipartisan-bills-would-bolstervoting-rights (reporting on bipartisan efforts to update coverage formula based on violations
within last 15 years).
UU See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (bridging divide between
current conditions justifying federal role and historical pretext for VRA).
101 See id. at 2635 (meaning Congress identified troublesome jurisdictions and created
standards to rein them under federal thumb). Furthermore, whenever voter dilution occurs with a
discriminatory purpose, it works in the same way as denying ballot access. See id; see also Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1993) (recognizing guaranteeing equal access to polls insufficient
to eliminate other racially discriminatory voting practices); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 569 (1969) ("[T]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as
by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)
(ruling on restriction imposed by states for candidate ballot access); H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 6
(2006) (finding developments in tactics from Bull Connor and fire hoses to insidious, subtle
institutionalized discrimination). The House Report found that "[d]iscrimination today is more
subtle than the visible methods used in 1065," "the effect and results are the same, namely a
diminishing of the minority community's ability to fully participate in the electoral process and to
elect their preferred candidates .... " See H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 6 (2006).
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conditions formula. 10 2 Since Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act
in 1982 without changing the coverage formula, the Supreme Court
reviewed two examples of purposeful racial discrimination in Alabama
and, and noted 700 voting changes that were blocked because they were
discriminatory.0 3
The dissent noted that Katzenbach held that equal sovereignty
"applies only to the terms upon which the States are admitted to the Union,
and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared." 0 4 Justice Ginsburg noted that the unprecedented extension of
the equal sovereignty principle would be problematic, and that the
inappropriate use of Katzenbach ignored the fact that all reauthorizations of
the VRA cited the case thereby granting the Supreme Court the opportunity
to review the "limited geographical scope" issue. °5 Therefore, the silent
overruling of Katzenbach in Northwest Austin was and is untenable. 0 6
Ginsburg concludes by showing that the majority ignored the volumes of
discrimination produced by the Congress in the reauthorization process of
2006, despite using the "current conditions" formula for review, which
would seem open to deferring to Congress in a situation where the
legislative body produced such a volume of evidence.O? The majority's
102

See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2646 (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting) (discussing current

burdens).
103 See id.at 2639, 2640-41, 2646-47 (listing examples of federal courts responding to racial
discrimination charges in Alabama and subdivisions therein); see also H.R. REP.No. 109-478, at
21 (finding that majority of Justice rejections to voting changes found discriminatory intent).
104 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2648-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see also
South Carolina v. Katzenbacl 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cnty. v.
Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
105 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (outlining hoops
majority jumped through to reach holding in Shelby County).
106 See id. at 2649 (highlighting approach taken to severely weaken federal efforts to enforce
anti-discrimination laws in elections).
107 See id. at 2650 (addressing lack of deference shown to Congress -as-a-factfinder in public
policy). Justice Ginsburg writes:
Congress designed [preclearance] ...
to catch discrimination before it causes hanm, and
to guard against return to old ways ....
Volumes of evidence supported Congress' determination ....
But, the Court insists, the coverage formula is no good; it is based on
'decades-old data and eradicated practices.' Even if the legislative record shows, as
engaging with it would reveal, that the formula accurately identifies the jurisdictions
with the worst conditions of voting discriminationthat is of no moment, as the Court
sees it. Congress, the Court decrees, must 'star[t] from scratch.' I do not see why that
should be so.
Id. Furthermore, the Court sent a demand to a Congress that was not only unlikely to bring up a
bill to draft a new and update coverage formula, but was also unable to achieve anything closely
resembling a functioning legislative body. See Chris Cillizza, Worst. Congress. Ever. The case in
charts, TEE Fix BLOG (Oct. 31, 2013 at 3:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
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decision to throw "out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing
to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella

in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.' 108 The majority's reverseengineering charge was countered by the context of reauthorization in 2006
compared to the challenge of drafting the VRA in 1965: one was forging a
new legislative frontier while the other was determining whether the usual
bad actors still required federal oversight. 10 9 The Congress concluded that

preclearance was needed, and it was not the Supreme Court's job to ignore
0
the record produced by the legislative branch. 11
fix/wp/2013/10/3 1/worst-congress-ever-the-case-in-7-charts/(analyzing through charts poor
approval marks for Congress); Ezra Klein, 96 Percent ofAmericans Think This Congress Is At or
Below Average, WONKBLOG (Dec. 12, 2013 at 11:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/20 13/12/12/96-percent-of-americans-thinkthis-congress-is-at-or-below-average/(analyzing result of NBC/Wall Street Journal poll); Ezra
Klein, 14 reasons why this is the worst Congress ever, WONKBLOG (July 13, 2012 at 8:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is-theworst-congress-ever/ (summarizing reasons for Congress's poor approval ratings). During oral
argument, Chief Justice Roberts alleged that Massachusetts had both the worst white-black
registration and participation ratio. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Shelby Cnty. V. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). The Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, William F.
Galvin, vigorously disputed the Chief Justice's assertions. See Akilah Johnson Massachusetts
official challenges ChiefJusticeRoberts 'claim about voting, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 1, 2013 at 4:05
AM), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2013/03/0 1/massachusetts-officialchallenge s-chief-justice -roberts-claim-about-voting/u8rYN2MVzc 3GOdq4cWyYEK/story.html
("The concept of black communities in Massachusetts not voting is an old slur, and it's not true. I
guess the point [Roberts] is trying to make is Mississippi is doing so much better they don't need
the Voting Rights Act. He can still relay that conclusion, but he shouldn't be using phony
statistics. It's deceptive, and it's truly disturbing."). Secretary Galvin pointed out that in the
2012 Presidential election, the difference in turnout in Charlestown, a neighborhood of Boston
where most voters are white, and in Roxbury, where most voters are African-American, saw only
a four percent participation disparity. See id Secretary Galvin, an alum of Suffolk University
Law School, "speculated that Roberts drew his conclusions using US Census Bureau data known
as The Current Population Survey, which collects information on voting and registration every
other year. Political scientists say this is one of the few national databases, if not the only one,
providing state-by-state voting information." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
"' Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (providing colorful analogy to
Roberts opinion in Shelby County and election law cases generally); see also Katz, supra note 6,
at 1616 (noting departure from traditional reviews and Roberts Court strict worldview). Katz
argues that the Roberts Court requires the electorate to be completely engaged, essentially writing
decisions that command attention and full some would say idealistic participation at levels
that would make campaign operatives salivate. See Katz, supra note 6, at 1616. The author
continues that this approach "implicitly rejects the role the Court and Congress have repeatedly
played in the electoral arena, and the portrait of the American voter on which federal involvement
has previously been premised." See id at 1616.
109 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Persily, supra
note 4, at 174 (arguing driving force of reauthorization was fear of not having VRA).
110 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting
intergovernmental branch debate over what is needed in securing nondiscriminatory elections).
Of note, the shift in authority and positions in election law is striking, whereas before 1965 the
state retained plenary powers to regulate elections, the VRA changed all that and shifted the
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IV. THE STATE OF OUR DEMOCRACY: WHAT SHOULD IT BE,
AND HOW DO WE GET THERE?
Consider "what is the state of our democracy, what should it be,
and how do we get there?""' Shelby County bestowed new freedom on
states in former preclearance jurisdictions, presenting the first new
framework through which litigators and policymakers viewed voting rights
since the Civil Rights Era." 2 In election law, partisan politics can never be
ignored, and political realities, however fleeting those may be, must at least
be considered when judges make rulings from the bench." 3 While there is
merit in reviewing a coverage formula that was adopted during the Nixon
Administration, the political reality is that the Congress will likely not be
able to adopt a new standard that worked as well as the old preclearance
formula." 4 Considering political realities is not necessarily the Court's
power at least in covered states-extensively towards the federal government. See supra notes
2, 3, 4, 9 and accompanying text (noting traditional deference to state election administration
changed in late 1950s to early 1960s); see also Hearing, supra note 27 (statement of U.S.
Representative Jerrold Nadler) (criticizing Shelby County decision for violating Congress's role
as legislative fact finder). Specifically, Congressman Nadler argued, "[t]he Court, arrogating to
itself the quintessentially congressional power to decide what facts are relevant and what
constitutes an appropriate remedy, struck down the formula in Section 4, eviscerating and
rendering a nearly dead letter the preclearance provisions of Section 5." See Hearing,supra note
27 (statement of U.S. Representative Jerrold Nadler).
... Timothy 0. Wilkerson, Adjunct Professor, Opening Lecture for Course in Election Law
at Suffolk Univ. Law School (Sept. 9, 2013).
112 See supra notes 3, 4, 9, 10, 110 and accompanying text (depicting modem approach
to
federal role in election law and administration).
113 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pushing for jurisprudence
and policymaking that takes issues as they are rather than should be). Justice Ginsburg refused to
concede the hill on the facts presented to the Court's and Congress prior to reauthorization:
The Court does not contest that Alabama's history of racial discrimination provides a
sufficient basis for Congress to require Alabama and its political subdivisions to
preclear electoral changes. Nevertheless, the Court asserts that Shelby County may
prevail on its facial challenge to § 4's coverage formula because it is subject to § 5's
preclearance requirement by virtue of that formula.... This misses the reality that
Congress decided to subject Alabama to preclearance based on evidence of continuing
constitutional violations in that State.
Id. at 2647 n.9.
114 See id at 2629 (majority opinion) (holding argues for updating coverage formula to deal
with today's problems). Chief Justice Roberts argued that:
The [Fifteenth] Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its purpose is to
ensure a better future....
.To serve that purpose, Congress-if it is to divide the States
must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light
of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past. We made that clear in
Northwest Austin, and we make it clear again today.
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problem or job, majorities in Congress come and go after all, but this
decision nevertheless leaves target groups-racial minorities and the
elderly-susceptible to voter dilution." 5 A renewed coverage formula
should take into account the successes of the last four generations in race
relations, but still be equipped to combat regressive and suppressive voting
administration tactics. 116
Briefly putting electoral politics aside, the elimination of the
preclearance coverage formula presents Congress with an opportunity to

redraft the VRA with a coverage formula that reflects advancements the
country has made, while keeping a fresh and workable policy structure that
ensures vigorous oversight for bad actors. 117 In today's political climate,
the prospects for passage of a new coverage formula seem dim. In the
113th Congress, the Republican majority in the House draws its margin

from jurisdictions previously covered under the preclearance formula." 8
North Carolina, the Southeastern states, and particularly Texas send
Republicans to the House in large numbers. 119 With increasing changes to

Id. at 2629-30 (citation omitted).
115 See id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing preclearance keeps country from rolling
back to overt voter discrimination). Justice Ginsburg pointed out:
[C]onditions in the South have impressively improved since passage of the Voting
Rights Act. Congress noted this improvement and found that the VRA was the driving
force behind it. 2006 Reauthorization § 2(b)(1). But Congress also found that voting
discrimination had evolved into subtler second-generation barriers, and that eliminating
preclearance would risk loss of the gains that had been made.
See id.; see also Persily, supra note 4, 215-26 (writing on historical conditions that justified the
VRA's "burden" on states).
116 See Lillis, supra note 99 (reporting on post-Shelby County efforts to renew preclearance);
Matthews, supra note 99 (suggesting formula focusing on recent historical violations).
117 Cf Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (recognizing existence of ongoing voting
discrimination notwithstanding increasing African American voter turnout in covered states);
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing need for preclearance to
protect against "subtler second-generation" voting discrimination); Pildes, supra note 24, at 756
(suggesting shift from Section 5's model to more uniform national oversight of voting practices).
Pildes argues that preclearance is not an essential element of voter protection and that renewed
efforts of developing "federal oversight should, perhaps, move from attempting to be selectively
targeted on specific jurisdictions to being of uniform national scope." See Pildes, supra note 24,
at 756.
118 See Jurisdictions Previously Covered By Section 5, supra note 15 (listing bad actor
jurisdictions); see also Castro, supra note 15 (describing conditions for voters in Texas).
119 See REDMAP 2012 Summary Report, REPUBLICAN STATE LEADERSHIP COMM. (Jan. 4,
2013), http://www.rslc.com/redmap_2012_summary_report (reporting on long range strategy to
shift state legislatures Republican to oversee state election administration); see also Sam Wang,
The Risk to the GOP'smajority in the House, PRINCETON ELECTION CONSORTIUM (Oct. 8, 2013
7:03 AM), http://election.princeton.edu/2013/10/08/the-risk-to-the-gop-house-majority/
(citing
2013 government shutdown and population shifts imperiling Republican majority in US House).
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the demographic makeups of those states, partisans have taken steps to
restrict voter access, and when legislatures change voting laws
to protect
0
incumbents the Supreme Court has approved those changes.12
After Shelby County, the federal role in stopping-or at least
reviewing-possibly discriminatory and restrictive voting laws has been
severely cut back. 12 1 Without the Section 4 formula, the Supreme Court
has paroled previously covered jurisdictions. 2 2 States are still subject to
Sections 2 and 5, preventing voting legislation that carry discriminatory
effects and purpose, but without the catchall preclearance review process,
the Department of Justice and individual challengers to state action are left
to deal with each issue on a case-by-case basis. 123 By refocusing on Tenth
Amendment powers to administer elections, the Supreme Court has
increased the burden on challengers to state laws, requiring substantial
showings of injury that will prove both adverse effects with an invidious
purpose. 124 Compare this standard with the Court's position regarding
voter identification laws in Crawford, where the state did not need to
establish concrete examples of voter fraud, but only needed to show
legitimate state interest. 125 The framework is unfair, politically motivated,

120

See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie,

526 U.S. 541,

548-49 (1999)

(reasoning no racial

classification when district lines correlate with race because drawn on political affiliations); Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S 952, 959-60 (1996) (reasoning racial data drove drawing of districts on
predominantly racial grounds); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (noting district design so
bizarre represented racial gerrymander and enough to bring VRA claim).
121 See Matthews, supra note 99 (noting changes in electoral policy landscape after Shelby
County); Overton, supra note 99 (suggesting modernizing VRA by updating preclearance and
requiring public disclosure).
122 See Matthews, supra note 99 (noting changes in electoral policy landscape after Shelby
County); Overton, supra note 99 (arguing for revival of preclearance based on recent malfeasance
and public disclosure).
123 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1996) (discussing need for
broad federal response rather than case-by-case handling of VRA claims), abrogatedby Shelby
Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Hearing, supra note 27 (statement of Prof. Spencer
Overton) (discussing justification, ramifications, and scope of eliminating preclearance from
VRA and resolving issues case-by-case); see also Chapin, supra note 11, at 327 (writing on need
for data-intensive research before challenging voting laws after Shelby County); Katz, supra note
6, at 1623 (reviewing anecdotal evidence of case-by-case litigation prior to preclearance); cf
About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 11 (discussing DOJ workload on VRA
claims); supra note 11 and accompanying text (citing conditions federal government works under
to enforce VRA).
124 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (examining Tenth Amendment federalism
principles and federal evidentiary challenges with administering fair elections).
125 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194-96 (2008) (noting valid
state interest in combatting voter fraud exceeds need for requiring evidence justifying policy);
Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125-26 (D.D.C. 2012) (allowing legitimate state interest
"without any concrete evidence of a problem" for Indiana and Texas), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886
(2013).
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and does no service to the health of the American experiment. 1
In a vacuum, without consideration of context, the Chief Justice's
call for an updated coverage formula provides an opportunity for America

to have a conversation about the state of race in this country. 127 The VRA
protects rights that are far too precious-and preservative-to leave in the
hands of standards set when America had not considered the impact of the
internet and social media on politics, much less whether Senators George
McGovern or Ted Kennedy could present a serious challenge to President
Nixon in 1972.128 In lies the problem however, by striking down the
Section 4 coverage formula, Roberts punted the VRA back to the 113th
Congress. 129 The 535 members sworn in on January 4, 2013 represented a

body that would set records for inaction, stalemate, and claimed the DoNothing-Congress title belt from the 1946 class that was successfully
assailed by Harry Truman in the 1948 presidential election.' 30
The Chief Justice's statement that "history did not end in 1965" is

informative.131

Race relations are undeniably different today than they

were in the Johnson Administration, many would say that the country is

substantially different than the Clinton Era on the 1990s. 13 2 Racism or state

126

See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2642-43 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)

(showing political incentive for "prevent[ing] changes in the existing balance of voter power").
The studies Justice Ginsburg referenced in her dissent established that voting patterns were more
racially polarized in jurisdictions, states, and political subdivisions that were covered under the
preclearance regulatory regime. See id. at 2643. Justice Ginsburg made a poignant comparison,
"[just] as buildings in California have a greater need to be earthquake-proofed, places where there
is greater racial polarization in voting have greater need for prophylactic measures to prevent
purposeful race discrimination." Id.
127 See id. at 2629 (majority opinion) (stating "history did not end in 1965" and equal
sovereignty principles should guide VRA review).
128 See id. (requiring current conditions to determine regulatory burdens imposed on states in
regulating elections); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202-03 (2009)
(establishing current burdens-current conditions construction); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886) (recognizing voting as a fundamental right); Capenv. Foster, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.)
485, 489 (1832) (holding score of legislative authority to regulate administration of elections).
"[lit is clearly within the just and constitutional limits of the legislative power, to adopt any
reasonable and uniform regulations, in regard to the time and mode of exercising that right, which
are designed to secure and facilitate the exercise of such right, in a prompt, orderly, and
convenient manner ....
See Capen, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) at 494.
129 See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 ('JI]f [Congress] is to divide the States [it] must
identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current
conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past. We made that clear in Northwest Austin, and we
make it clear again today.").
130 See Cillizza, supra note 107 (analyzing problems associated with 1
13 'h Congress); Klein,
supra note 107 (articulating 1 13 'h Congress's unpopularity using public policy metrics and
polling data).
131 See Shelby Cvty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629.
132 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (discussing need for preclearance
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sponsored discrimination today rarely takes the form of George Wallace at
the University of Alabama, or Bull Connor in Selma.'33 The absence of
Manichean narratives in today's society reflects our modem benefit of
hindsight on a bygone era, and that worldview leaves litigators and voting
rights advocates susceptible to judges who favor a colorblind over colorconscious worldview from the bench. Several members of Congress have
introduced a bill that would reestablish preclearance in jurisdictions that
had discriminatory voting laws within the last fifteen years; leaving four of
the nine states subject to preclearance. 134
The bill introduced on January 16, 2014 by Senator Patrick Leahy,
Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, and Representative John Conyers
interestingly does not include voter identification laws as a sign of "badacting. , 135 News coverage of the bill took quotes from liberal activists
incensed by the exclusion. 136
Suspending the inevitably political
ramifications for a moment, there does not have to be an invidious intent or
result when instituting a voter identification law. 1 37 In Indiana, the state

structure to allow for changes in racial discrimination over time); see also supra note 33 and
accompanying text (citing impact and merits of streamlined administrative procedure under VRA
rather than case-by-case litigation).
133 Cf Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting notoriously
hateful and violent events that pushed VRA to passage); Ellement, supra note 3, at 267-70
(discussing development of VRA and events that led to changes after passage); Persily, supra
note 4, at 177 (noting preclearance necessary to more effectively respond to rapidly passed
discriminatory state legislation). Preclearance was a sound "remedy ... because case-by-case
adjudication of voting rights lawsuits proved incapable of reining in craft Dixiecrat legislatures
determined to deprive African Americans of their right to vote, regardless of what a federal court
might order." Persily, supra note 4, at 177; see supra note 29 and accompanying text (detailing
historical pretext for VRA).
134 See Lillis, supra note 99 (reporting on bipartisan efforts to update coverage formula based
on violations within last 15 years).
135 See id.(reporting on bipartisan efforts to update coverage formula based on violations
within last 15 years).
136 See id.(reporting on bipartisan efforts to update coverage formula based on violations
within last 15 years).
137 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2008) (noting "evenhanded" restrictions on voters are permissible if it satisfies Anderson test); Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) ("Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all
restrictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionallysuspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates."). Anderson found
that an early filing deadline for independent candidates for President in Ohio placed an
unconstitutional burden on voting and associational rights of the candidate's supporters. See
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 785-86. Anderson promulgated a balancing test widely used in Election
Law dicta to weigh the intrusiveness of the state action against the interests of the voters. See
id. at 789. The test calls the courts to consider:
The character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify
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took measures to reach the widest swath of potential citizens who would
need an ID card. 38 Texas did not attempt that same level of effort, and like

the Lone Star State, other states have been slapped by federal courts for
wading into voter discrimination's invidious weeds. 3 9 To implement voter
identification laws without discriminatory impact, state governments would

have to make a substantial financial investment -such

as the relaxation of

fees for alternative identification, keeping regional state offices open and
staffed longer to service would-be voters-likely requiring more revenue

from the taxpayers. 140
By compelling marginalized groups to put between $15 and $35
down for a photo ID, Republican legislators carry less risk of blowback

from the electorate for naked electoral discrimination. 141 The fee presents a
politically
minimized
significant
is shifting,

significant issue for progressive activists, but the effect is
in jurisdictions that retain deep Republican roots. 142 Texas is
because some political scientists and observers believe the tide
and the line between a wedge issue for the MSNBC crowd and

and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine
the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden plaintiff's rights.
Id. at 789.
138 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198-99, 209 (discussing "minimal burdens" in Indiana's
"generally applicable" voter identification statute).
139 See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (2012) (outlining myriad of constitutional
problems Texas's SB 14 presented when reviewed), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). Texas
argued that SB 14 was written facially neutral, so it was entitled to less strict review. See id. at
143. However, this was a diversionary argument because, had Texas outlined SB 14 on racial
lines, it would have been facially discriminatory. See id. The VRA was written to deal with both
facially neutral and facially discriminatory laws. See id. Furthermore, Election Law dicta does
not favor a pre-set litmus test for challenges; instead relying on Anderson sliding scale analysis.
See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 210-11; Burdick v. Takushi 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Anderson, 460
U.S. at 789.
140 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 117-18 (addressing limited access for voters to regional
DPS office for IDs under SB 14). SB 14 required voters to travel to a regional DPS office to
obtain an EIC card. See id. Only 81 of Texas's 254 counties have such an office, and they
typically have shorter operational hours. See id; see also Langholz, supra note 12 (examining
parameters within which voter identification statutes could pass constitutional muster prior to
Crawford).

141 C Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2642-43 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting general incentive for legislators in majority to take steps to retain power). This is
distinguishable from practices that correlate on racial lines because of party identification
because, rather than incumbency protection, Ginsburg argues that race is the predominant factor.

See id.

142 See Lillis, supra note 99 (noting progressive displeasure with bipartisan efforts to draft
preclearance legislation).
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143
an electoral majority in Texas could-hyperbole aside-become blurred.

If voter identification laws were legitimate-not in the state interest context
but in the political intent context-the state government in Texas would not
limit the accessibility of regional offices to provide EIC cards, and would
make the identification cards available without any up-front or secondary
fee. 144 This is where politics meets the law, and where litigators and
progressive lawmakers alike can unite behind a common theme: if the state

legislators were concerned about a legitimate state interest-combatting
voter fraud-why make the new identification cards so difficult to

obtain? 1 45 Logically, this weakens the argument about combatting voter
fraud pushed by conservative and moderate lawmakers: with more people
146
who can obtain valid state ID there will be less in-person voter fraud.
When Texas creates hurdles for Latino voters to obtain EICs, they are not
fighting voter fraud. 14 7 The legislators are trying to minimize the electoral
impact of a voting bloc that does not generally share the same values as
Republican voters, while keeping the state's costs to a minimum.148 If the
143

See discussion supra note 16 (discussing theories regarding Texas becoming presidential

and electoral battleground state due to population shifts).
144 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing for federal
involvement in safeguarding voting rights when racial majorities prevent minority access).
Justice Ginsburg saw this issue as the "quintessential political problem requiring a political
solution." See id. at 2633; see also Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 117-18 (reviewing accessibility
issues under Texas's SB 14 for voters obtaining EIC).
145 Cf South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1966) (reviewing need for
federal legislation to keep pace with rapidly shifting discriminatory strategies), abrogated by
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Chief Justice Earl Warren summarized the need
for preclearance in his decision, and it answers the rhetorical question asked in the text:
Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes requiring as many as 6,000
man-hours spent combing through registration records in preparation for trial.
Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part because of the ample opportunities for
delay afforded voting officials and others involved in the proceedings. Even when
favorable decisions have finally been obtained, some of the States affected have merely
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted
difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity between white and Negro
registration. Alternatively, certain local officials have defied and evaded court orders
or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls.
Id. at 314.
146 See Langholz, supra note 12, at 788-92 (discussing education and outreach programs
associated with voter identification statutes statewide). Of all the sources the author cites, none
relate to the efforts taken by Texas prior to, during, or after the drafting, implementation, and
litigation associated with SB 14. See generally Langholz, supra note 12.
147 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 125, 142-43 (outlining several inconsistencies identified
by DOJ during SB 14 litigation in federal court).
148 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (detailing factors
that
pushed VRA to passage); Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (reviewing history in Southern states
that led to VRA); see also Ellement, supra note 3, at 261-62, 265-66 (discussing historical
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average, fair-minded voter were forced to pay for a program that serves
pure partisan interests, the voters could punish the Republican legislators
responsible. 149 However, by serving purely partisan interests, the average
voter has to provide less tax dollars towards the voter identification
program, because the goal is to keep certain people out of the ballot box,

rather than fight voter fraud. 50
If the Justice Department reviewed 5000 Section 5 claims and over
15,000 voting changes annually, the burden on government litigators, as
well as organizations such as the League of United Latin American
Citizens, to respond to each potential Voting Rights Act violation without a
preclearance catchall is immense. 15 1 Some scholars actually believe the

activities leading to VRA and preclearance); supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting VRA
intent to dispel "blight" of racial discrimination in democratic process).
149 See Pitts, supra note 16, at 1580-81 (discussing Pildes's advocacy for discriminatory
effect standard in maintaining accountable and competitive districts). What Pitts and Pildes are
addressing correlates to Justice Ginsburg's point about majoritarian incentives to retain power.
Cf Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even though incumbency
protection is more likely a general principle across ideologies, the efforts to restrict voter access
that have received the most widespread notoriety occur in overwhelmingly Republican districts,
states, and political subdivisions. See Persily, supra note 4, at 177 (noting Dixiecrat policies
spawned VRA preclearance); Pildes, supra note 16 (discussing Republican safe seats after GOP
controlled redistricting in 2010).
150 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (inferring incentive for
legislators to retain power can fall along racial divides); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679
F.3d. 848, 865-73 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (summarizing recent suppressive tactics Congress used as
evidence to renew VRA). The record provides a glimpse at other tactics besides voter
identification statutes used by so-called "second generation" bad actors:
Consideration of this evidence is especially important given that so-called "second
generation" tactics like intentional vote dilution are in fact decades-old forms of
gamesmanship. That is, "as African Americans made progress in abolishing some of
the devices whites had used to prevent them from voting," both in the late nineteenth
century and again in the 1950s and 1960s, "[o]fficials responded by adopting new
measures to minimize the impact of black reenfranchisement." These measures
"well-known" tactics such as "pack[ing]" minorities into a single district, spreading
minority voters thinly among several districts, annexing predominately white suburbs,
and so on were prevalent "forms of vote dilution" then, and Congress determined that
these persist today. Specifically, Congress found that while "first generation
barriers" flagrant attempts to deny access to the polls that were pervasive at the time
of Katzenbach have diminished, "second generation barriers" such as vote dilution
have been "constructed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in the
electoral process." Although such methods may be "more subtle than the visible
methods used in 1965," Congress concluded that their "effect and results are the same,
namely a diminishing of the minority community's ability to fully participate in the
electoral process and to elect their preferred candidates of choice."
Shelby Qyiy., 679 F.3d. at 865 (citations omitted); see Pitts, supra note 16, at 1580-81 (reviewing

political impact of unaccountable and uncompetitive districts).
151 See Beerv. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (restating speed at which legislatures
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revival of preclearance is not necessary if federal legislation were passed
requiring every state making a voting change that had been challenged 1to
52
show concrete evidence and examples justifying the restriction on voters.
This shifts some burden of proof back onto the state trying to restrict the

vote. 153 This is a compromise option, currently there is no requirement on
the state to show evidence justifying the voting restriction, and the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing discriminatory intent and purpose .
While
states are entitled to latitude in administering elections, courts should still

lean against restrictions on voters, rather than tipping the scales to
preserving the traditional state prerogative.

155

By forcing the states to show

examples justifying their restrictions on voters, Congress can balance the
burdens on both parties. 5 6 As the law currently stands, the American legal

could outpace Congress in election administration). "Section 5 was a response to a common
practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new
discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down." Id. at 140 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 94-196 pp. 57-58); see Ellement, supra note 3, 267-68 (highlighting time and labor
costs for individual litigators slower than states can pass discriminatory statutes); see also
Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Spencer Overton) (hypothesizing impact on litigators and
political operatives after Shelby County.); About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 11,
(discussing average DOJ caseload reviewing 5000 §5 claims and voting changes per year).
152 See Matthews, supra note 99 (quoting Prof. Overton) (calling for updated coverage
formula that focuses on recent offenses to minority voting rights); see also Pildes, supra note 24
(discussing alternative approaches to combatting voter suppression beyond preclearance
construction).
153 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 187-88 (2008) (noting
District
Judge problems with lack of persuasive or credible evidence cited by Indiana); Persily, supra note
4, at 193-94 (describing record presented by Congress found to be unsatisfactory in Shelby
County).
154 See Shelby Cnt., 679 F.3d. at 865-73 (summarizing recent suppressive tactics Congress
used as evidence to renew VRA); supra note 59 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 204 (2008)
(upholding ballot restriction against third party candidate lacking sufficient statutory support);
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 452-53 (2008) (rejecting
political party's argument that blanket primary system facially violated associational rights);
Crawford,553 U.S. at 200 (upholding Indiana voter identification statute by reviewing impact on
general population not target classes). But see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (allowing
§ 5 challenge under equal protection to contest bizarre district drawing); Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (rejecting Ohio statute limiting ballot access for third parties
establishing balance test); Tashjianv. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (ruling against
state regulation of party primary process and allowing party to have open primary); Kusper v.
Pontikes 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (striking down Illinois statute that kept voters from changing
parties until 23 months after election); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 778-79 (1965) (striking
Texas statute that prevented active military members from registering to vote while serving);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (striking down poll taxes as
unconstitutional burden on rights of voters); see also Katz, supra note 6, at 1615, 1619, 1623,
1626-27, 1631-32 (strengthening federalism principles in election law jurisprudence during
prominent era for federal authority).
156 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959-60 (1996) (requiring state to show race was not
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system considers the traditional prerogative of the state to be more
important, more essential, more fundamentally worthy of preservation, than
the citizenry's right to participate in the democratic process.17
This works in two ways. First, this method retains respect for the
plenary powers of the states to regulate and administer elections according
to their judgment because the burden of proving discriminatory intent and
purpose remains the standard. 58 Considering in Texas v. Holder the
plaintiffs needed to essentially catch the Texan legislators and David
Dewhurst red handed to prove intent, the states can retain enough plausible
deniability to maintain their robust legislative and administrative
prerogative.15 9 The burden of proof remains on the plaintiff, it remains
high, and the Tenth Amendment is paid its due service.
Second, compelling states to provide concrete examples to justify
the restrictions preserves the solemn goal of civic engagement, "eliminates
solutions in search of problem" legislating, and acts as a disclosure
mechanism for legislators acting to preserve partisan interests through
invidious discrimination.' 6' Other areas of election law require evidence of

predominant factor in redistricting map drawing); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217 (compelling state to
establish valid interest in preventing party from regulating primary); Karcher v. Daggett 462 U.S.
725, 742 (1983) (compelling states to show almost no population deviation in congressional
districting); see also Persily, supra note 4, at 216 (shifting burden of proof to jurisdictions under
VRA construction requires determinations be nonpartisan).
157 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) (making equal sovereignty and
state's rights arguments superseding current justification for VRA's unique federal construction);
Crawford,553 U.S. at 204 (holding state interest outweighed limitations to participation outlined
by the plaintiff). Justice Stevens argued:
The state interests identified as justifications for SEA 483 are both neutral and
sufficiently strong to require us to reject petitioners' facial attack on the statute. The
application of the statute to the vast majority of Indiana voters is amply justified by the
valid interest in protecting "the integrity and reliability of the electoral process."
Crawford,553 U.S. at 204 (citation omitted).
158 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623-24 (discussing DOJ attempt to prove discriminatory
purpose by compelling testimony from Texas legislature, Lieutenant Governor); Texas v. Holder,
888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (D.D.C. 2013) (discussing federalism concerns in context of
determining discriminatory purpose), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). The court denied the
federal government's request for all "legislative acts or a legislator's motivations with respect to
the bill." Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Katz, supra note
6, at 1634-35 (reviewing how Rehnquist Court handled VRA-10h Amendment implications);
Persily, supra note 4, at 215-26 (discussing how VRA changed 10ih Amendment role of states in
administering elections).
159 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing privileged communications for
legislators during deliberation).
160 See Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (interpreting VRA to minimizing federal intrusions in
denying government's request for legislative materials).
161 See Parson, supra note 67, at 94 (noting opponent of voter ID consider restrictive
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harm, specifically discrimination claims under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, to prove a claim. 162 Here is where the Tenth Amendment

compromise occurs, because the default answer to this issue is that courts
and the Congress should not dictate how legislatures in sovereign states
make public policy. 163 Framed in that way, it would seem as though
compelling states to show cause for their policy decisions would destroy
the delicate balance in federalism. 164 However, this is precisely what

measures unnecessary absent voter fraud evidence). Parson argues:
Opponents consider the photo identification requirement as a new poll tax, the
descendent of the insidious poll taxes that were common in the South and meant to
disenfranchise black voters. Milwaukee Representative Gwen Moore called the
measure "a solution in search of a problem. It would disenfranchise the elderly,
disabled, poor, students and ethnic minorities.
Id.
162

See Persily, supra note 4, at 193-94 (reviewing route Congress took to requiring evidence

to prove VRA claim); see also Bums, supra note 15, at 245 (reviewing purpose and effect
burdens of proof during 2006 Reauthorization). Bums writes:
In step two of the analysis, the court evaluated the history and pattern of abuse. The
court distinguished the evidence of voting discrimination in the 2006 Reauthorization
legislative record in two overlapping ways. First, the court separated the evidence into
incidents of intentional discrimination which show a discriminatory purpose, and
circumstantial evidence, which primarily illustrates discriminatory effect. Second, the
court evaluated the specific types of evidence, including evidence relied upon in City of
Rome to uphold the 1975 extension and evidence reviewed by Congress in the 2006
Reauthorization legislative history.
Burns, supra note 15, at 245.
163 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201, 216 (2009)
(challenging VRA constitutionality on 10th Amendment rights for political subdivisions); Persily,
supra note 4, 215-26 (2007) (stating VRA inverts traditional relationship between state-federal
governments); see also Katz, supra note 6, at 1634-35 (reviewing Rehnquist court treatment of
VRA federalism issues).
164 See Persily, supra note 4, 215-26 (discussing novel federalism implications raised by
VRA and Congressional reauthorization); see also Katz, supra note 6, at 1634-35 (highlighting
turning point in language used describing VRA and inversion of intergovernmental interaction).
Katz writes:
Prominent among these decisions is the Rehnquist Court's 1999 decision in Lopez v.
Monterey County., California. Acknowledging the "substantial 'federalism costs"
resulting from the VRA's "federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local
policymaking," Lopez recognized that the Reconstruction Amendments "contemplate"
this encroachment into realms "traditionally reserved to the States." Lopez affirmed as
constitutionally permissible the infringement that the VRA's Section 5 preclearance
process "by its nature" effects on state sovereignty, and applied Section 5 broadly,
finding that a County's nondiscretionary implementation of state law must be
precleared.
Katz, supra note 6, at 1634-35.
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occurs in redistricting cases when the court is presented with a district that
is "so bizarre on its face that [the district] is 'unexplainable on grounds
other than race."' 165 So while plaintiffs still bear the burden of establishing
a cohesive minority voting bloc that is thwarted by a majority voting group
in a district, the bizarre shape of the district immediately pressures the state
into showing justification as to why their remains cohesive, unity of
interests. 166 If it works, to the extent it does, in redistricting, a minimal
burden shifting on the
states to show concrete examples of voter fraud is
16 7
not a bridge too far.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County endorsing the
"current burdens justified by current conditions" formula for evaluating
state legislation aimed at restricting voting rights has left vulnerable
populations exposed, public and nonprofit litigators overwrought, and
given the public more reason to distrust yet another American institution.
The Court's adherence to color-blind rather than color-conscious
jurisprudence does an immense disservice to target populations who have
experienced a history of racial discrimination at the voting booth.
Moreover, it further entrenches current electoral majorities, deepening the
political polarization in the American electorate. Ironically, for a Court
that reflects rightward ideology that focuses heavily on judicial restraint
and judicial economy, the Court's action-which benefits Republican
candidates-does nothing to advance fiscal conservatism. Shelby County
likely drives up discovery costs and leaves the federal court system clogged
with a litany of challenges to the hundreds of state statutes administering
new election regimes. The Court's decision to defer to Congress-while
welcome in other areas of Constitutional law-fails to acknowledge a body
that is suffering through a historically frustrating period of paralysis,
inaction, and hyper-partisanship.
Professor Wilkerson challenged his
students to assess the state of our democracy, and question where it should
be. If a right preserves all rights, it is incumbent on the state to relinquish
power, so that its government authority is legitimized rather than
165

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
166 See League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 525-26 (2006) (adding
additional factors to consider through Gingles Test); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-49
(1986) (determining test in redistricting challenges under discrimination claims).
167 See Latin American Citizens, 548 U.S. at 526-27 (adding additional factors to consider
through Gingles Test); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-49 (determining test in redistricting challenges
under discrimination claims).
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marginalized. 168 "There are moral absolutes," and a society that impinges
on the rights of its citizens to participate in a representative democracy is
not living up to the ideals of self-government, inhibiting the potential of a
169
free and great people.
Joseph P. McCarthy

168

Shaw).
169

See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (paraphrasing Chief Justice Lemuel
The West Wing: We Killed Yamamoto (NBC television broadcast May 15, 2002).

